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The Importance of Ecological Security for 
Protective Security 
 
A CASE STUDY OF NORTHERN CHINA AND THE IMPACT OF 
WATER SCARCITY ON FOOD SECURITY 
 
MOLLY A. WALTON 
Boston University 
M.A. Candidate, International Relations and Environmental Policy 
 
 
China’s surging growth rate of nearly 10% over the past 20 years has accelerated the 
nation to the forefront of the global economy. However, this growth has been predicated 
upon the destruction and depletion of the natural environment. Consequently, China is 
beginning to experience the deterioration of its ecological capital, particularly in regards 
to its water supply. This paper seeks to evaluate the impact of water scarcity in Northern 
China on the Chinese Communist Party’s policy of food self-sufficiency by utilizing the 
protective security component of Amartya Sen’s development as freedom framework. It 
is argued that ecological security is a fundamental element of protective security and that 
the degradation of China’s ecological capital, specifically its water resources has led to an 
increased ecological insecurity which has negatively affected China’s ability to ensure its 
version of protective security. Therefore, there exists great impetus for the CCP to 
address water scarcity, as the ramifications of a lack of access to water have sweeping 
implications for the development and food security of the nation. However, because the 
CCP has focused more on ensuring the short term supply of water rather than fixing the 
demand, it has failed to address China’s water mismanagement. As a result, its failure to 
address its ecological insecurity greatly impinges upon its ability to ensure protective 
security via food self-sufficiency.  
 
 
Over the past 30 years, China has embarked upon a dramatic transformation, 
implementing reforms and policies to promote expansive economic growth. As a result, 
China has witnessed a dramatic reduction in poverty, while access to education and 
health care has been vastly improved (United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 
2006, 142). Even so, such rapid growth and development is rarely achieved without 
significant costs, in terms of both human and ecological capital. For example, the income 
gap between rural and urban sectors has widened, and inequality within rural areas has 
continued to increase since the 1990s (World Bank 2005). Moreover, China may be 
unable to sustain its explosively emergent economy, markets, and standard of living 
without a significant negative long-term impact on its environment and natural resources. 
This is nowhere more evident than in China’s approach to food and water. Until 
now, China has operated solely from a supply first mentality, enacting policies to ensure 
heightened food production and supplying the water necessary to make that happen. 
Rapid urbanization and increasing affluence have accelerated the demand for resources, 
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especially water.  It seems that China’s “economic success has been maintained partly 
through a mounting ecological overdraft, with Northern-China now facing a mounting 
crisis in water management” (UNDP 2006, 142). 
Northern China is indeed the “epicenter” of China’s water troubles (UNDP 2006, 
142). It houses nearly half of the nation’s population (and half of its rural poor), supports 
40% of its agricultural land, produces a large quantity of grain, and contributes roughly a 
third of GDP (UNDP 2006, 142). Furthermore, China’s national policy of food self-
sufficiency forces farmers to maintain or increase yields despite the declining availability 
of water (Cai, 14, 2008). While food security has always been high on the political 
agenda of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the turbulence in the global energy and 
food markets witnessed in 2007-2008, and the rapid hike in food prices has solidified 
CCP commitment to food self-sufficiency (Khan et al. 2009, 350-51). 
Therefore, the question China must grapple with is whether or not the ongoing 
degradation of its water supply has a critical threshold beyond which further development 
can no longer be sustained. Moreover, to attain its ambitious policy of protective security 
it must parse out alternative solutions to its water scarcity in order to ensure ecological 
security. 
 
Ecological Degradation as a Source of Unfreedom 
 
Amartya Sen sees the role of development as removing sources of unfreedom that 
hinder individuals (1999, 3). Specific examples of unfreedoms are poverty, tyranny, 
social deprivation, and a lack of basic social goods such as health, education, and 
infrastructure (1999). He establishes five basic types of freedoms as vital for holistic 
development: political freedoms, economic facilities, social opportunities, transparency 
guarantees, and protective security (1999, 10).  
 This paper seeks to utilize one facet of Sen’s framework of development: 
protective security. For Sen, protective security is the implementation of social safety 
nets and institutional arrangements so as to ensure the security and protection of its 
citizens against potential misery and harm from a sudden disaster, either man-made or 
natural (1999,40).  The inability of a nation to maintain its ecological integrity 
undermines the capacity of a government to pursue and ensure the security and protection 
of its citizens. While it is recognized that holistic development, according to Sen, requires 
the pursuit of all aspects, this paper only evaluates the influence of ecological capital on 
protective security, positing that protective security is impossible without ecological 
security. In this sense, ecological insecurity is the impact of environmental degradation 
on the existing natural capital (air, land, and water) that causes social, political, and 
economic conflict or instability (Environmental and Security Study). 
  While Sen only implicitly states the role of ecological capital as a factor for 
protective security, the two are deeply intertwined. A degraded environment is both a 
symptom and cause of man-made and natural disasters and can diminish an individual’s 
security and impinge upon his/her development. One of the first to explicitly state this 
connection was Duraiappah (2001, 2004) who emphasized the need to include ecological 
security within Sen’s framework for development because development is dependent on 
sustained ecosystems (Cosbey 2004, 14). Thus, ecological security is one of the freedoms 
that allow an individual to pursue that which he or she has reason to value (Cosbey 2004, 
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14).  A lack of ecological security is a form of unfreedom and a hindrance to 
development.  
In order to evaluate China and the impact of water scarcity in Northern China on 
development from the vantage point of protective security and consequently ecological 
security, it is vital to understand that China’s perception of protective security is a 
variation of that envisioned and detailed by Sen. In essence, China has adopted policies to 
prevent food insecurity by implementing a national goal of food self-sufficiency. 
However, China’s implementation of protective security is without other freedoms, such 
as open discussion, public scrutiny and democracy, which Sen deems instrumental (1999, 
188). Furthermore, the degradation of China’s ecological capital, specifically water 
resources, has led to an increased ecological insecurity that has negatively affected 
China’s ability to ensure its version of protective security. Thus, it seems that there exists 
great impetus for the CCP to address water scarcity, as the ramifications of a lack of 
access to water have sweeping implications for the development and food security of the 
nation. 
In order to understand the implications of water scarcity in Northern China for the 
CCP and thereby evaluate it through the lens of protective security, it is important to 
comprehend the complexity of the problem. Therefore, this paper will first set the stage 
by briefly detailing the nature of China’s rural development and food security policy. 
Second, it will look at China’s water endowment and the problems stemming from water 
scarcity in the North. Thirdly, it will evaluate the intersection of water and agriculture, 
and its implication for food security.  And finally, it will, within the context of Sen’s 
framework, appraise actions taken by the CCP to address water scarcity to ensure 




 China’s history is deeply tied to its agrarian roots and has constituted the 
foundation of Chinese development throughout history.  Over the last 20 years the CCP 
instituted aggressive rural development policies. These reforms have been credited for 
lifting hundreds of millions of rural residents out of poverty (Khan et al. 2009, 350). This 
has been coupled with a breakneck integration into the global economy which has helped 
spur its astronomical economic growth rates of nearly 10% over the past 20 years, 
accelerating it to the forefront of the global economy (Gleick 2009, 79). 
 “For China, the primacy of xiokang [literally, “well off”], on reaching internal 
economic development goals, is central to its governmental policies. Focused on bringing 
the majority of the Chinese population into the middle class, the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) leadership views the attainment of a US 3,000 per capita gross domestic 
product by 2020 as the primary means of doing so (Alagappa 2008, 284).”  Given 
China’s history as a peasant agrarian society, and given that much of China’s poor reside 
in rural areas, much focus has been placed on rural development (Khan et al. 2009, 350).  
Agriculture is part of China’s lifeblood and constitutes the major livelihood for 
rural residents (Cai 2008, 20).  This is evidenced through its many sayings such as 
“Agriculture is the base of China”, and “Food is first necessity” (Smit and Yunlong 1996, 
205). China began to reform the agricultural sector 20 years ago by reducing price 
distortions and shifting the distribution of land away from collective farms towards rural 
Josef Korbel Journal of Advanced International Studies | 64 
 
households (Khan et al. 2009, 350). The household responsibility system (HRS) brought 
about land-use rights for individuals, technological change, price and marketing reforms, 
trade liberalization, and irrigation expansion (Bhandari et al. 2006). These policies were 
implemented in order to spur greater agricultural production and China has witnessed a 
substantial increase in per capita food consumption (Khan et al. 2009, 350; Bhandari et 
al. 2006). In fact, China’s rural development has been touted as the “biggest anti-poverty 
program the world has ever seen” leading to the “greatest increase in economic well 
being (and food security) within a 15 year period in all of human history” (Sachs et al. 
1994, 131).  
During the 1980s and 1990s agricultural productivity skyrocketed and the per 
capita grain output reached levels similar to developed nations (Khan et al. 2009, 350). 
This allowed farmers to shift towards the production of higher valued crops (FAO 2003).  
Economic growth is a vital factor for the reduction of poverty, but is not the only 
condition needed for widespread reduction (Bhandari et al. 2006). Thus, despite the 
monumental gains made by these reforms, more than 100 million farmers and their 
families remain in abject poverty (Khan et al. 2009, 350). Furthermore, although the per 
capita income of many Chinese has increased, the gap between rural and urban areas 
remains large and inequality has remained high in rural areas since the 1990s (World 
Bank 2005).  
China’s rapid development has caused other problems as well. Increasing 
urbanization and affluence have introduced new demands on food production and an 
increased burden on rural China to meet these needs (Khan et al. 2009, 351). “The pursuit 
of economic growth has been the priority overshadowing the vital issues of water 
resources and ecological balance” (Gleick 2009, 79). Yet, water is inextricably linked to 
all development related sectors, including energy, population, industry, and agriculture, 
both the quantity and quality of water have a fundamental impact on the reduction of 
poverty in China (Khan et al. 2009, 349).   
To meet these demands, more land and more water are being consumed and have 
resulted in the overuse and degradation of resources, with which China is already poorly 
endowed (Khan et al. 2009, 351). Signs of environmental stress are emerging in soil 
erosion, salinization, and a decline in land and water quality and quantity (Bhandari et al. 
2006). These natural constraints, coupled with a short historical memory of the 1950s 
famines that were caused by faulty economic and political policies, drive the CCP to 
equate food self-sufficiency with national security (Belzlova 2008). 
 
China’s Policy of Food Self-Sufficiency 
 
 At a macro-national level, food security has been defined as ensuring that 
“adequate supplies of food are available through domestic production and/or through 
imports to meet the consumption needs of the country’s population” (Bhandari et al. 
2006). However, it is important to note that food security constitutes more than just the 
adequate supply, but also stability of supply and available access by the poor (Bhandari et 
al. 2006).  
China has long been preoccupied with its ability to feed its burgeoning population 
(FAO 1998, 115). Yet, the CCP understands food security as food self-sufficiency in 
which food is mainly supplied through domestic channels. The CCP emphasizes that the 
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maintenance of high levels of food self-sufficiency is a matter of national security and 
stability (FAO 1998, 115). Early evidence of the centrality of self-sufficiency is 
highlighted in a statement from the State Council in 1996, which emphasized that, “Only 
when the Chinese people are free from food availability and stability of food supply 
worries can they concentrate on and support the current reform, thus ensuring a sustained, 
rapid and healthy development of the economy (FAO 1998, 115).” 
The centrality of food self-sufficiency courses through the CCP’s agricultural 
policy (FAO 1998, 127). Even harkening back to the Ninth Five-Year Plan for 1996-
2000, the CCP called for agricultural growth and the maintenance of food self-sufficiency 
(FAO 1998, 127). 
This line of thinking holds true in today’s agricultural policies. The CCP has 
mandated that its self-sufficiency should be near 95 percent (Belzlova 2008). To this end, 
the government in 2008 announced that it would increase rural spending by 30 percent, 
placing it at around 80 billion US dollars for the year (Belzlova 2008).  However, the 
CCP is faced with great uncertainty in its quest to ensure food self- sufficiency as factors 
such as population growth, urbanization, climate change, and income growth stimulate 
food demand and increase the burden on rural agriculture (FAO 1998, 116).  
Furthermore, it must do so despite the increased competition between sectors for a 
shrinking supply of land, and – critically – water resources.  
 
China Water Endowment 
 
The UN Water Program defines water scarcity as: “The point at which the 
aggregate impact of all users impinges on the supply or quality of water under prevailing 
institutional arrangements to the extent that the demand by all sectors, including the 
environment, cannot be satisfied fully (UNDP 2006).” China is vast, its water policy is 
diverse, and its water problems are extremely complex. Chinese water resources are 
“over allocated, inefficiently used, and grossly polluted by human and industrial wastes” 
(Gleick 2009, 79). Stretches of rivers are dead, lakes are filled with waste, groundwater 
aquifers are being rapidly depleted, three hundred million people lack access to safe 
water, and excessive groundwater withdrawals are creating scarcity in Northern China 
(Gleick 2009, 79). These problems threaten economic growth and food security (Gleick 
2009, 79).  
When evaluating total water resources among nations in the world, China is 
ranked 5th (Lohmar et al. 2003, 1). However, it ranks among the lowest when its water 
resources are evaluated per capita (Lohmar et al. 2003, 1). China’s per-capita annual 
renewable water availability is 2,140 cubic meters (Gleick 2009, 83). From 1994-98, 
China’s per capita use increased by 130% and its total water use increased by about 
430% (Lohmar et al. 2003, 3). Although agriculture and irrigation receive the lion’s share 
of water, the industrial and domestic sectors’ demand keeps expanding (Varis and 
Vakkilainen 2001, 94).  From 1949-98, the share of China’s water used by agriculture fell 
from 97% to around 69%, while industry increased from 2% to 21% and domestic use 
increased from 1% to 10% (Lohmar et al.2003, 3).  
Demand is projected to increase, with varying sectors each demanding a larger 
share of a shrinking supply. According to projections, between 1997 and 2010, water 
demand will grow by 13.0 km3 (8%) and by 31.4km3 (20%) between 1997-2030 (Cai 
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2008, 16). Industrial growth, increases in farmer productivity and a growing population 
supplemented by a growing income all compete for already scarce water resources 
(Lohmar et al. 2003, 1). In all of China, water shortages are linked to not only the 
quantity of water through mismanagement, lack of adequate water supply facilities, and 
overdrafting of aquifers, but also to the water’s quality, manifested as pollution, 
euthrophication, organic matter pollution and saline intrusion (Yang and Zehnder 2001, 
82; Cai 2008, 14). 
To further compound the complexity, the distribution of water within China is 
highly skewed as Southern China has access to abundant water while the more heavily 
populated North is arid and water is scarce (Gleick 2009, 84). This factor, combined with 
the burgeoning population, inadequate infrastructure and poor water policy and 
management have heightened water scarcity (Gleick 2009, 85). In fact, more than two-
thirds of China’s 600 cities suffer from water shortages (Gleick 2009, 85). Furthermore, 
several provinces reside in the absolute water scarcity category, among them Beijing, 
Tianjin, Hubei, Shanxi, Shandong, Henan, Ningxia, Jiangsu, and Shanghai (Yang and 
Zehnder 2001, 81). However, nowhere is water scarcity more prevalent than in Northern 
China. 
 
Northern China Plain and Water Scarcity 
 
Water stress has been defined as “occurring when the demand for water exceeds 
the amount available during a certain time frame and or when poor quality restricts its 
use” (Cai 2008, 14). Per capita renewable water is the most commonly used indicator of 
water stress and a measure of 1000m3/capita is the recognized level for severe water 
scarcity (Cai 2008, 14).  Three major basins in Northern China, the Huai, Hai and Huang 
(3-H basins) have 520, 470, and 530m3 respectively, well below the indicator threshold 
(Cai 2008, 14). To further complicate matters, these three basins contain 40% of China’s 
agriculture and produce 32% of China’s GDP despite the fact that they have less than 8% 
of China’s water resources (Cai 2008, 14). 
Water stress in Northern China is generally characterized by inefficient use, 
increased demand from non-agricultural sectors, limited water quantity, and decreasing 
water quality (Varis and Vakkilainen 2001, 93). Scarcity is the product of several 
interconnected factors. First, Northern China is situated in a Monsoon climate, receiving 
78% of its annual rainfall between June and September (Yang and Zehender 2001, 83).  
Low regional rainfall and runoff further exacerbate the problem. When comparing the 
average precipitation and runoff from 1956-1979 with those for the three river basins in 
2000, the average precipitation decreased by 9.6% while runoff decreased 23.8% and 
flow to the ocean decreased by 58.6% (Cai 2008, 15).  
Secondly, decreasing water quality exacerbates water scarcity, which in turn 
negatively impacts food security (Khan et al. 2009, 354). Diminished quality is due to 
industrial and municipal development, as these tend to emit large amounts of pollutants. 
These pollutants are in addition to runoff from fertilizer and pesticides that have been 
used extensively in agriculture for the past two decades (Cai 2008, 16). Pollution in the 
form of sewage discharge has doubled between 1980-2004 in the 3-H basins and has 
increased by 160% in the Huai River and by 140% in the Huang River (Cai 2008, 16).  In 
Northern China, about 40-60% of the water in the monitored rivers is rendered useless by 
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pollution (Kahrl and Roland-Holst 2009, 354). The World Bank estimated that the cost of 
pollution-induced water scarcity was upwards of 3% of local GDP in water scarce areas 
of China (World Bank 2006).  
Several studies have indicated that the total volume of degraded water in China 
may increase from 204 million m3 in 2002 to 232 m3 in 2010 to 357 million m3 in 2020 
(Khan et al. 2009, 354). These figures not only threaten GDP growth, but also damage 
agriculture and hamper productivity, as agriculture bears the brunt of the damage (56%) 
compared to health and industry which account for 20% and 18% respectively (Khan et 
al. 2009, 354). The end result is that China’s ability to achieve sustained levels of food 
production from irrigated agriculture is hindered, which, along with the potential 
variations in the quantity of water, places Chinese food security at significant risk (Khan 
et al. 2009, 354). 
Finally, the region relies heavily on agriculture producing about half of China’s 
grain and almost all of its wheat and maize, all of which are sustained by nonstop 
irrigation (Lohmar et al. 2003, 3). It is estimated that within the three river basins, 
agriculture accounts for 84% of total water consumption (Cai 2008, 15). This has created 
myriad problems as the constant extraction of groundwater has steadily depleted the 
groundwater table (Yang and Zehender 2001, 85). 
Groundwater is used at a higher rate than the aquifers are being refilled, especially 
as the course of water to refill the aquifer diminishes. This has caused the water table to 
drop by as much as 70m (Varis and Vakkilainen 2001, 95). A linear extrapolation from 
the record of the annual decline in groundwater from 1980-1996, suggests that 
groundwater in the Northern China Plain will be depleted by 2030 (Lohmar et al. 2003, 
1). 
It is evident that water scarcity, both in terms of quality and quantity, has a drastic 
impact on the various auspices of the region, and carries significant ramifications for 
agriculture, irrigation, and subsequently, food security in China. 
 
A Closer Look at Agriculture and Irrigation in Northern China 
 
 Water is a key driver of agriculture. Thus, decreasing agricultural water resources 
will further compound the volatile and often vulnerable interrelationships between food 
and water (Fischer et al 2007, 1084; Yunlong 1997, 296).  It is estimated that overall food 
production in China will decrease by 14-23% by 2050 (Erda et al 2008, 3). This problem 
is particularly acute in Northern China where water shortages are already placing severe 
limitations on agricultural production, and it is only likely to worsen as it is compounded 
by several other anthropogenic factors: population, urbanization, industrialization, 
lifestyle shifts, and increased consumption (Khan et al. 2009, 349).  
As the population of China continues to surge upward food demands rise with it. 
This pushes China to further develop its policies on food self-sufficiency, leading to 
expanded agricultural development in Northern China despite the lack of available water 
(Gleick 2009, 85).  There remains doubt whether China is capable of increasing 
production as, “China’s agriculture is already pushing the resource capacity to a very 
high degree…Production is highly intensive, makes full use (some say over-use) of land 
and water resources, and there is little excess capacity” (Smit and Yunlong 1996, 214).   
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The basins of the Huai, Hai,Huang (3H) are vital agricultural and industrial areas 
(Lohmar USDA).  These basins alone are responsible for the production of 67% of 
China’s wheat, 50% of its cotton, and 40% of its corn (Lohmar USDA).  Within these 
basins, agriculture must also fight increasing industrial and domestic demands, as these 
basins are also home to 1/3rd of the nation’s population and industry (Lohmar USDA). 
All of these needs are sustained by less than 10% of China’s water resources, and the 
strain on agriculture is increasingly prevalent as agricultural productivity is highly 
dependent on the availability of surface and groundwater resources (Lohmar USDA). 
As surface waters in Northern China diminish, more regions are turning to 
groundwater withdrawals through the drilling of wells to tap aquifers for irrigation to 
ensure sustained production (Changming et al 2001, 266). Wells are highly concentrated 
in Northern China: 73% of total Chinese wells exist there, and 64% of irrigated areas 
depend on wells to provide groundwater (Yang and Zehnder 2001, 85). Since the 1960’s 
over two million wells have been drilled in the area (Lohmar et al. 2003).  
 However, as water is continually depleted, a cyclical and unsustainable 
relationship occurs where, as more water is used, more wells need to be drilled. But, 
more wells means less water overall. In 1997, 222,000 new wells were drilled while 
100,000 were deserted (Yang and Zehnder 2001, 85). This means that 45% of the new 
wells were offset by deserted ones (Yang and Zehender 2001, 85).   
Such actions are unsustainable and the repercussions are already being felt as the 
shortage of water for irrigation is estimated to be 1.6 billion m3/year (Changming et al 
2001, 265). In several areas, groundwater levels are now hundreds of meters below 
ground, forcing farmers, cities, and businesses to dig deeper to find an adequate and clean 
supply (Gleick 2009, 86). This is evident in Northern Hebei province where only a 
decade ago, wells were adequate at 20 to 30 meters deep, whereas today, residents must 
drill to depths of 120 to 200 meters ( Gleick 2009, 86).  Not only are there social 
repercussions, but there are also economic repercussions as drilling deeper can cost a 
farmer about half of his/her annual income (Gleick 2009, 86). This has led farmers to 
move away from food staples often seen as the pillars for food security to more lucrative 
cash crops such as fruit and vegetables (Lohmar USDA). 
These matters are not trivial issues, and are only likely to get worse until 
groundwater withdrawals are limited. Until then, and given the transfer of water away 
from agriculture to China’s industrial and urban sectors, China’s agricultural productivity 
will be hampered by the dual nature of the increased cost and scarcity of water (Gleick 
2009, 86; Khan et al. 2009, 353). Furthermore, if climate change is factored in, the level 
of uncertainty increases regarding the availability of water resources to sustain yields 
(Khan et al. 2007). 
 
What about Climate Change? 
 
 Many assert that climate change in accordance with heightened water issues will 
push Chinese agriculture over the brink of sustainability (Smit and Yunlong 1996, 214). 
“There is concern that China’s population carrying capacity has almost reached its limit 
now, so this balance between productive capacity and food needs becomes even more 
precarious under scenarios of climate change” (Yunlong 1997, 296).   
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The ongoing drought presently wreaking havoc on agricultural production in eight 
provinces in China only serves to emphasize the vulnerability of China’s agricultural 
sector and heightens awareness of the severe threats to the food supply posed by climate 
change and water scarcity (Yu 2009). On February 5, 2009, the Chinese government 
announced a severe drought emergency in the provinces of Hubei, Shanxi, Anhui, 
Jiangsu, Henan, Shandong, Shaanxi and Gansu (Yu 2009). It was reported that as of 
February 9, over 18.4 million hectares of farmland and 9.1 million hectares of cropland 
had been affected by the drought (Yu 2009). 
 Droughts in China have caused a loss of around 22 million hectares of farmland 
and 10 million tons of grain annually (Yu 2009). The most serious of these came in 2000 
and 2001 in which China’s crop yields dipped by near 50 million tons/year (Yu 2009).  
Prime Minister Wen Jiabo, in an attempt to offset declining agricultural productivity, 
boost yields and increase rural incomes, announced a 20% increase in agricultural 
production as a means to offset a potential food crisis (Watts 2009). 
While some climate scenarios suggest that yields may actually increase due to 
warming and the enrichment of CO2, great uncertainty exists regarding how China’s 
water problems will impact crop production (Smit and Yunlong 1996, 214). Most 
scholars assert that water, or the lack thereof will negatively impact yields, further 
straining the stability and adaptation ability of China’s food production system (Smit and 
Yunlong 1996, 214).   
Lei Ming, an environmental economist at Peking University spoke of the 
dichotomy this way stating, “The impact of climate change on food production is 
uncertain. It may go up, but it is also possible that we will face massive food shortages. 
To avoid such a risk, we need to prepare ourselves” (Watts 2009).  
 
Ecological Capital and Development 
 
The maintenance of the environment is crucial for continued development. While 
the environment is often capable of absorbing abuse in the face of economic growth, in 
the long run, such actions are unsustainable. Therefore, it is often argued that the 
maintenance of ecological capital is a vital element of development (Cosbey 2004, 39).  
Cosbey details the following as part of a nation’s ecological capital: stable climate, 
adequate watershed function, and adequate stocks of natural resources (2004, 39). As has 
been emphasized in previous sections of this paper, Northern China is experiencing 
diminished ecological capital in all three of the areas detailed by Cosbey. This is 
important for a host of reasons as the maintenance of ecological capital is  
 
particularly important to quality of life, in the absence of such services as 
stable climate and adequate watershed function, mankind is destined to be 
pummeled by a larger number of ecological catastrophes such as floods, 
droughts, intense storms, and other extreme weather events. Changed 
environmental patterns and a weak natural condition wreak havoc on 
established human systems, with attendant social strife (Cosbey 2004, 39). 
 
Cosbey goes on to state that less acute, but often more significant, is the role played by a 
stable natural environment as the pillar for human economic development (2004, 39). The 
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ramifications of a poorly maintained environment reverberate throughout developmental 
objectives as it can limit the ability of an individual to escape many of the unfreedoms 
listed by Sen such as poverty, social deprivation, and lack of access to health and 
education. 
The water shortages experienced by China are limiting agricultural development 
and negatively impacting urbanization in a growing number of regions in China (Loeve et 
al. 2007).  Not only does a lack of water diminish economic potential, it also reduces 
food security, a critical component of China’s domestic policy (Khan et al. 2009, 357). 
Furthermore, because this policy of self-sufficiency requires farmers to produced high 
yields with crops that are dependent on irrigation, sustained agricultural production is in 
turn dependent on the assured availability of water (Khan et al. 2009, 354). And sustained 
production is vital for Chinese food security (Khan et al. 2009, 354). 
Studies have shown that limited or constrained water resources combined with 
unlimited and unconstrained economic activity can lead to social unrest and threatens 
economic growth (Gleick 2009, 79).  Growing dissent has been documented over the 
allocation and quality of China’s water (Gleick 2009, 79). The Chinese government 
recognizes the unrest, and reported that 2005 witnessed over 50,000 environment related 
protests (Gleick 2009, 79).  The increased unrest has rendered the CCP wary, and it is 
beginning to address the consequences its unfettered growth has had on its water 
resources. 
  The leaders of the CCP are cognizant that the current practice of trading the 
environment for economic growth is unsustainable (McNally et al. 2009, 291). President 
Hu Jintao has emphasized the need to shift towards “harmonious” development, linking 
the growing gap between the rich and the poor along with the increase in environmental 
and human health problems as direct causes of social instability and mass incidents 
(McNally et al. 2009, 291). Furthermore, he highlighted that freshwater was one of the 
most vital environmental concerns of China, in terms of its availability and its quality 
(McNally et al. 2009, 291).  Pan Yue, the vice minister of SEPA stated in 2005, “The 
[economic] miracle will end soon because the environment can no longer keep pace” 
(Economy 2009, 1).Thus, there is broad recognition at the upper echelons of government 
of the necessity to address the impacts that water scarcity is and will continue to have on 
development, and consequently on the stability of the region (Economy 2004, 87). Water 
shortages pose a threat to society, the environment, the economy, and agriculture and 
food security (Zhu). Thus, water scarcity has become an unfreedom as China has eroded 
its ecological capital and facilities. In its national policy to ensure food security, it has 
restricted and degraded another aspect of protective security: ecological security. 
Ironically, then, its promotion of economic freedom has counteracted its attempts to 




For Sen, development involves removing sources of unfreedoms and pursing 
holistic development through the advancement of political freedoms, economic facilities, 
social opportunities, transparency guarantees, and protective security (1999, 10). At a 
cursory glance, it would appear that China’s view of development impedes its ability to 
implement the type of development that Sen deems appropriate and necessary. 
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While the CCP has sought to implement and ensure certain facets of protective 
security, through the implementation of a national policy of food self- sufficiency, it has 
encountered barriers, especially in Northern China, due to a lack of available water. 
Because of the overarching and continuing lack of ecological security, the CCP’s efforts 
to ensure food security have been diminished. Yet, China remains set on continued 
economic growth and it is this obsession with economic output and the maintenance of 
growth, in conjunction with its national development policy of food security that has 
spurred its response to the water scarcity in Northern China.   
Ironically, the manner in which the CCP has attempted to address water scarcity 
by and large has had mixed results in bolstering both ecological and thereby protective 
security. This is because the main policy position of the CCP has been to expand supply 
rather than curtail demand (Gleick 2009, 79).  This mindset is captured in an old saying 
in China, Kaiyuan Jieliu, meaning ‘opening up more sources and economizing on use’ 
(Yang and Zehnder 2001, 88). The importance of water resources management is well 
recognized and considered to be a priority issue at the highest levels of the Chinese 
Government. As noted in Premier Zhu Rongji’s Report on the Tenth Five Year Plan: 
 
Lack of water resources is a serious limitation on the economic and social 
development of our country. We need to put water conservation high on our 
work agenda, establish a rational system for management of water resources 
and a rational pricing mechanism, comprehensively adopt water conservation 
technologies and measures, develop water-efficient industries, and raise the 
entire society’s awareness of water conservation. Prevention and control of 
water pollution should be strengthened…We need to expedite the planning 
and building of projects to divert water from the south to the north (Rongji 
2001). 
 
While the above statement shows the recognition of the need for efficiency gains, thus 
far, China has stuck to its well-worn mode of water management: colossal infrastructure 
to provide more supply, this time through the massive South-to-North Water Transfer 
Project (SNWTP). The SNWTP exemplifies water management in China. China’s past 
approach to water management has focused on the exploitation of water as a cheap 
resource to bolster industrial and agricultural production and has done so by the 
continued expansion of supply (Lohmar, USDA).  
This is exactly how the CCP has sought to deal with the water scarcity plaguing 
the North. Fearful of impeding upon agricultural development by placing limits on the 
water allowed for irrigation or withdrawal, the government has instead implemented a 
campaign to expand the water supply via the SNWTP (DeSalle et al. 2008, 1). 
The South-to-North Water Transfer Project (SNWTP) is to be fully functioning 
by 2050, servicing the water needs of over 400 million people by diverting 44.8 billion 
m3 of water annually (DeSalle et al. 2008, 1). The scope and scale of this project is such 
that it will become the largest civil engineering initiative (in both investment and 
infrastructure) ever implemented by the Chinese (DeSalle et al. 2008, 1). Given 
projections that water demand will soon far exceed supply in the North, the Chinese 
Josef Korbel Journal of Advanced International Studies | 72 
 
government has invested U.S. $62 Billion for the development of this inter-regional water 
transfer infrastructure (DeSalle et al. 2008, 1).1
Sustainable and efficient management of water has historically been secondary to 
economic growth (Gleick 2009, 97). However, the increasingly limited availability of 
water in China has the potential to move it towards more efficient management as it seeks 
to stretch out the amount that remains (Palaniappan and Gleick 2009, 13). It then can be 
argued that the realization of the finite nature of water will move China towards a soft 
path approach to water management (Palaniappan and Gleick 2009, 13.) The concept of 
soft path was first espoused by Amory Lovins in the 1970’s in his description of an 
alternative approach for meeting human energy needs that was based on more efficient 
use rather than a simple increase in the supply (Palaniappan and Gleick 2009, 13). 
Recently several scholars, Gleick among them, have incorporated this idea into water 
management whereby instead of continuously seeking new sources to meet demand, 
working to diminish the demand through improved efficiency and productivity of 
 
Many government officials see this project as a necessity, a fact exemplified by 
remarks made by President Jiang Zeming who stated, “in order to radically alleviate the 
severe water shortage in the northern areas, building the South-to-North Water Transfer 
Project is necessary” (Zeming 1999). The SNWTP was approved in 2002, and consists of 
three major sections, Eastern, Central and Western, covering four major watersheds 
(DeSalle et al. 2008, 4).  
Incongruously the allotted share of water from the SNWTP designated for 
irrigation is miniscule as the priority of water from the transfer is to quench the 
increasing demand in China’s Northern municipal and industrial sectors (Yang and 
Zhender 2001, 89). Part of the rationale for this allotment is that the economic return for 
each unit of water used in agriculture is considerably lower than that used in the 
municipal or industrial sector (Yang and Zhender 2001, 89). Furthermore, the total 
volume expected to be transferred in the first segment is only 15 billion m3 (Yang and 
Zhender 2001, 89). Of this only 2.95 billion m3 of this granted to agriculture (Yang and 
Zhender 2001, 89). 
Moreover, the very practice of pricing water for irrigation lower than it is worth 
not only encourages the wasteful use of the scarce resource, but also provides incentives 
for locals to shift water used in irrigation to other sectors, further diminishing the amount 
available for agriculture, which has a negative impact on food production and 
consequently, food security (Yang and Zhender 2001, 89). 
Given that irrigation will remain the largest user of water in Northern China, and 
since the SNWTP allocates a majority of the water transferred to other sectors, it seems 
clear that an alternative solution must be found in order to sustain agriculture and prevent 
food insecurity. Thus it would appear that the SNWTP is based upon purely political 
arguments, seeking to pacify concern over water scarcity in the North, rather than basing 
its water management strategies on food security concerns. The objectives of the CCP are 
to provide water to the thirsty Northern Basin, yet it is certain that the transfer of water 
will not be enough, especially not when it comes to agriculture and food security. 
 
Alternative Solutions: Embracing a Soft Path Approach 
 
                                                 
1 Projections show demand increasing by 40% by 2020 (DeSalle et al. 2008, 1). 
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existing water (Palaniappan and Gleick 2009, 13). According to scholars Cooley and 
Gleick, the transition to a soft path,  
 
involves a wide range of changes in water management, polices, 
technologies, and approaches…a major effort to improve the efficiency of 
water use, to continue to provide the goods and services society demands, 
while reducing the pressure on water resources (2009, 101). 
 
There exists large opportunities for improving efficiency in water use in China 
(Gleick 2009, 93).  Water use per GDP is much higher in China than elsewhere in the 
world (Gleick 2009, 93).  Measures to improve efficiency will prove important especially 
as the industrial sectors share in water consumption continues to increase, a factor that 
has the potential to impact food security. According to Chinese scientists, the growing 
water demands of the urban and industrial sectors could result in the elimination of winter 
wheat in northern China “as agricultural uses give way to higher-valued uses that produce 
more jobs and income per unit water” (Gleick 2009, 94).  
 
Benefits of efficiency 
 
 A study done by Pereira et al. in 2000 found that the North China Plain could save 
an estimated 30% of water if irrigation methods were improved (Yang et al. 2003, 147). 
These efficiency gains seem highly attractive given the lack of priority irrigation is given 
in the allotment of water from the SNWTP. 
 Policymakers see economic tools such as proper pricing and the reduction and 
elimination of subsidies as possible avenues for a sustainable approach to water 
management (Gleick 2009, 95). Water has historically been heavily subsidized, though 
recent efforts by the government to re-evaluate the price structure may change this 
(Gleick 2009, 95). A government official in the Shenzhen water resources bureau was 
quoted as saying, “Increasing the price of water is an effective solution to easing the 
shortage” (Gleick 2009, 95). 
 Another way in which China can greatly improve their efficiency is with 
irrigation. Given that irrigation is responsible for a large amount of water withdrawals, 
gains in efficiency in irrigation could have a drastic impact in reducing water scarcity in 
the North. The World Bank, in a study conducted in 2000 concluded that water 
conservation projects with the goal to “increase the value of agricultural production per 
unit of consumed water through increasing yields and reducing non-beneficial water 
losses” was a sound economic strategy (Berkoff 2003, 11). The report found that the 
internal rate of return for conservation projects for agriculture was on average 21% with 
some projects achieving rates of 25% (Berkoff 2003, 11). Water savings were reported to 
be in the range of 60-95Mm3/year (Berkoff 2003, 11). Given the incapability of the 
SNWTP to fully address all facets of the water shortage in the North, a move towards 
more efficient management could greatly benefit agriculture, maintain China’s food 








Sen wrote, “The dangers of insecurity, arising from change in economic or other 
circumstances or from uncorrected mistakes of policy can lurk behind a healthy economy 
(1999, 184).”  Until China makes demand rather than supply the core focus of its water 
policy, water scarcity will continue to hinder the CCP’s goals of food self-sufficiency. 
The SNWTP might mitigate scarcity in the short run, but is not a viable solution long 
term, especially considering the pressures from other factors. As population surges 
upward, climatic impacts become more frequent and unpredictable, and industrial and 
domestic water demands grow, water and food resources will be further strained.  
The focus on increasing supply may guarantee protective security in the short run 
by avoiding a sudden crisis, but by failing to tackle the increasing ecological insecurity 
caused by the mismanagement of Northern China’s water resources, the CCP will 
encounter increasing difficulty in achieving its goals for food self-sufficiency. It would 
seem that for China long-term protective security hinges on ecological security. In order 
to ensure ecological security, the CCP needs to combat the real underlying causes of 
water scarcity. China is capable of radical transformation and development. This is 
evidenced by its dramatic integration into the global economy initiated by Deng 
Xiaoping. But now CCP leaders no longer have the luxury of choosing between growth 
and the environment. The choice is no longer an either or. The CCP must be bold, such as 
it was two and half decades ago, and rest its protective security on improved ecological 
security rather than economic growth. As the 2006 UNDP aptly states, “[water] scarcity 
is a policy-induced outcome flowing from the predictable consequence of inexhaustible 
demand chasing an underpriced resource (133).”  Until China addresses the real causes of 
its ecological insecurity, it will be unable to sustainably continue its pursuit of protective 
security, and the ramifications of a failure to ensure both ecological and protective 
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